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Abstract 
Following the recent increase in ML activities, prominent substantial hubs for finance are 
becoming increasingly subjected to abuses within the financial sector. With all the systems 
and regulatory bodies in place assumptions are that the financial sector within the western 
hemisphere would assume more of a rigid position in the event of market abuses. As the 
years go by it seems like market abuses are increasingly dominating the western 
hemisphere subjecting them to a higher level of crime and terrorism. This paper focuses 
specifically on financial regulation within the western hemisphere in comparison to the legal 
advances of developing states, particularly, on measures provided by the international 
community to reinforce AML regimes. One concludes that the West assumes a lot of power 
concerning the global financial sector, assuming that developing states emulate/ mimic 
established rules in order partake in global financing.  It assesses why globalisation has both 
contributed towards, and helped to resolve ML, by measure of international combatting 
rates, whilst enforcing international standards which close any existing gaps to reduce/ 
eliminate the likelihood of financial abuses.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Scope 
ML is becoming increasingly globalised and has been the primary cause of the recent 
increase in fraud and governmental negligence within the financial sector.  ML is defined as 
the method by which criminals attempt to legalise the proceeds of their crimes whilst 
concealing the source. Both the World Bank and IMF explain ML as a concealment method 
over finances obtained through criminal activity, to indulge in profits obtained as well as 
control.1 FATF defines ML as “the processing of criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal 
origin”.2 The process of concealment is what the named bodies distinguish as an 
indispensable element of ML, as it is the group or individuals aim to hide the illicit activity 
by which the money is obtained. The financial dictionary supports FATF in describing ML as 
the altering of the appearance of finances obtained through illegitimate means.3 The 
processing of illicit funds has been the stumbling block for the international community and 
its control mechanisms have been slow to reconcile with technological advancements.4 The 
Vienna convention includes the word ‘possession’ in its definition and extends the scope of 
ML to those who so much as own illicit funds from crimes.5  Absconding from the various 
                                                          
1 Paul Allan Schott, Reference guide to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, 
Second edition (World Bank 2006) I–1, 1–3 para 3 
2 fatf-gafi 2016, 'Money laundering' (Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2016) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/> accessed 3 July 2016 
3 Farlex Financial Dictionary and Campbell R. Harvey., 'Money laundering' (TheFreeDictionary.com 2012) 
<http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Money+Laundering> accessed 29 July 2016 
4 'FORUM: Using technology and big data to tackle fraud and money laundering', (Financier Worldwide 
Magazine, August 2016) <http://www.financierworldwide.com/forum-using-technology-and-big-data-to-
tackle-fraud-and-money-laundering/#.V7p3YZgrLNM> accessed 22 August 2016 
5 United Nations, ‘FINAL ACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION 
AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES’ 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf>accessed 7 July 2016 
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definitions of ML, a precedent has been established in order to provide the global 
community with a common reference on what ML means, both regionally and 
internationally.  
The abuse of a state economic structures extends further than the activities contracted by 
individuals within the state, thus making it a matter or international apprehension. 6 Within 
the United Kingdom, a recent upsurge in ML questioned its standing in the international 
financial community. The difficulty in comprehending why such a substantial financial hub 
is increasingly subjected to abuses within the financial sector can potentially diminish the 
respect shown by their international counterparts on regulatory power in enforcing AML 
regimes.7 With all the systems and regulatory bodies in place it is the assumption that the 
western hemisphere’s financial sector would assume more of a rigid position in the event 
of market abuses. In the last six years’ market abuses have increasingly been the norm in 
the western hemisphere,8 subjecting them to a higher level of crime and terrorism. London 
especially is known to have strict control on the financial sector to detect financial crime 
through the use of European regulation, 9 however financial crime is increasingly innovative 
and it can use various channels to launder money into the system undetected. Regardless 
                                                          
6 HM Government, 'Recovering the Proceeds of Crime' (CABINET OFFICE 2000) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/
assets/crime.pdf> accessed 2 July 2016  
7 James Hanning and David Connett, 'London is now the global money-laundering centre for the drug trade, 
says crime expert' The Independent - Crime (4 July 2015) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/london-is-now-the-global-money-laundering-centre-for-the-
drug-trade-says-crime-expert-10366262.html> accessed 21 June 2016 
8 Tim Wallace, 'City watchdog battles more market abuse and insider trading' The Telegraph (12 July 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/07/12/city-watchdog-battles-more-market-abuse-and-insider-
trading/> accessed 22 August 2016 
9 Home Office, 'Action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance' (2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517992/6-2118-
Action_Plan_for_Anti-Money_Laundering__web_.pdf> accessed 7 July 2016 
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of the scrutiny the UK or the western hemisphere may apply on their systems to promote 
AML, ‘dirt-money’ can always enter in different forms.  
(Figure 1) 
The banking system in developing and emerging market economies generally adopt a more 
sluggish attitude toward establishing thorough background checks. Biagio Bossone and 
Larry Promisel, prominent advisors to international financial bodies, assert that developing 
states must refine their structural policies within the banking frameworks to reduce the 
global financial risk. 10 Here arises the question on CDD and the ability to monitor and 
detect suspicious transactions. Although the detection of unusual banking practices has 
improved in the last 20 years,11 the global economy is taking greater steps towards 
regulating favouritism. Both directives on the EU market in Financial Instruments ensure 
                                                          
10 Biagio Bossone and Larry Promisel, 'Responding to the global financial crisis strengthening financial systems 
in developing countries the case for incentives-based financial sector reforms' 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/strengthpaper.pdf> accessed 29 July 2016 
11 McKinsey & Company ‘The Future of bank risk management’ (Working Papers on Risk July 2016) 
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that this is possible relative to sales practices.12 The movement of money is finding new 
multifarious and innovative methods of entering into the economy, especially in London. 
Given the free-flowing nature of money, one may understand that with use of a company 
established in the BVI, a house in West London can be bought by either a trust or 
company.13 Foreign companies using foreign transactions make it harder for background 
checks to be undertaken on foreign buyers as non-traditional financial assets cannot be 
regulated as adequately as traditional methods of transactions. 
A report by the Financial Times confirms the use of secretive methods to conceal assets 
facilitates ML. Essentially, front companies devise fake entities and disguise closely guarded 
corporate records. The lack of transparency allows money to be transferred even more 
anonymously and quickly. Misrepresentation is highly likely in such an anonymous and 
lucrative environment. The difficulty to locate sources of wealth may make financial checks 
stricter. Irrespective, differentiating institutions, from the purchase of expensive homes 
and life insurance policies, which are not as well-regulated as investment accounts 
exemplify the move of funds without trace and verification of foreign individuals. A report 
by Mark Camilleri, a ML reporting officer, examines the likelihood of abuse in the life 
insurance market and concurs that the ability to unequivocally place and recover large 
sums of funds may be subject to abuse by criminals.14 Any open and free market economy 
gives rise for new ways of moving money in. The governing of suspicious assets, especially 
                                                          
12 European Council, ‘Directive 2004/39/EC’;  
13 Tom Burgis, 'Dark money: London’s dirty secret' (25 July 2016) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1d805534-
1185-11e6-839f-2922947098f0.html> accessed 29 July 2016  
14 Mark Camilleri, FCII, and Chartered Insurer, 'What is the real money laundering risk in life insurance? High-
Risk, Low-Risk or No Risk—That is the Question' (ACAMS today, 29 February 2012) 
<http://www.acamstoday.org/what-is-real-money-laundering-risk-in-life-insurance/> accessed 29 July 2016 
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in an international context, requires standards of conduct for banks and other financial 
bodies.  
The international community has focused on unifying its capital markets, yet have refused 
to openly use the developments within the western hemisphere to transcend to developing 
states, and also integrate its banking practises to form a coherent system that combats 
money laundering and corruption. Standards emerge over practices and global acceptance 
can examine a solution over the network on AML. 
Globalisation has undoubtedly made ML easier and the technological advances have only 
obscured specific manners by which money is moved through the international financial 
system. The UNODC and the Director of Economic affairs for the Commonwealth 
Secretariat have acknowledged that between $600bn and $2tn are moved within the 
international markets each year,15 the enormity of this estimation supports the hypothesis 
that this global phenomenon requires a solution which the global community should 
standardise. By observing case law, legislative progressions and standard creating bodies 
like FATF, this paper will draw on how to further enforce corporate regulation through legal 
developments. 
The preconception on technological advances, in regards to international AML regimes , 
exposes regulatory advancements of developing states with the western hemisphere as a 
mitigating factor for further development. Introducing FAFT as an international standard is 
                                                          
15 UNODC, 'Money-laundering and globalization' (24 October 2007) 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html> accessed 29 June 2016; Sue 
Thornhill and Michael Hyland, A manual of best practice for combating money laundering in the 
financial sector (Commonwealth Secretariat 2000) IX pt Preface  
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not enough, it relations with the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money 
Laundering in West Africa(GIABA) and Middle East & North Africa Financial Action Task 
Force (MENAFATF) continues to assert resolutions outlined by customary law.16 The 
objectives are: To assess remedies on integration of global AML regimes, regarding 
monetary practises. To produce a more coherent system combatting ML and corruption. 
Identify regulatory norms within the western hemisphere in comparison to developing 
states. Examine the standards that emerge and recommend ideas on alignment, bridging of 
financial practices and subsidiaries, the power of the west regarding ML, diversification and 
powers over International bodies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 'UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME UNITED NATIONS 2000', 
(2000) <http://www.menafatf.org/images/UploadFiles/UNConvetionAganistTransnationalOrgCrime.pdf> 
accessed 17 August 2016 
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Chapter 2 – AML & CDD (Literature review) 
AML  
Emmanuel Ioannides, an international relations advisor, suggests that ‘understanding the 
different techniques used by criminals to introduce their ill-gotten gains into the legitimate 
financial system’,17 implements an assimilation of improved AML policies. Economic crime 
has made 36% of the official and underground economy.18 Over time the definition of what 
constitutes ML has shifted from simply burglary and drug dealing to now include financial 
crimes that are cross-border, advancing towards the shadow economy also known as the 
unreported economy –  including economic activity like fiscal fraud, violating market 
regulation. Instances like the above must be deprived from making a socio-economic 
contribution and in essence should be hindered from gaining control of reputable financial 
centres alike London and New York under a concealed appearance. 
The Watergate scandal (1974) exemplified how illegal assets may be transformed into legal 
assets,19 this case on bribery and concealment of information showed the international 
community that market violation can happen in many forms and at different levels. AML 
mechanisms arose before the notion that 9/11 curtailed the importance of ML. The funding 
of crime has been an unwanted feature of the markets since the Irish Republican Army, and 
                                                          
17 Emmanuel Ioannides, Fundamental principles of EU law against money laundering (Ashgate Publishing 2014) 
18 Edgar L Feige, The Underground Economies (Cambridge University Press 1989).; PWC, 'Adjusting the Lens on 
Economic Crime, Preparation brings opportunity back into focus' (Global Economic Crime Survey 2016) 
<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf> accessed 
22 August 2016 
19 United States v Nixon [1974] Supreme Court of the United States, 418 US 683 (Supreme Court of the United 
States). 
 
Candidate number: 1545582 
Page | 8  
 
the rise of white collar crimes.20 With morals and ethics in question one may agree with 
John Locke, that for a fair chance in life one must consider the rules governing the ability to 
live in a liberalist society. The conflicting view to his theory may be that the underground 
economy is not wrong, and from an ethics standpoint incurs no real risk on the stability of 
the economic system as a whole from an individual trying to make a living, although 
governments should still create remedies protecting proprietary rights.21 
Al Capone had notoriously used laundrettes to conceal, transfer and legalise the true source 
of illegal money, and this economics of ML saw the inception of the Council Directive 
91/308/EEC as the first binding European directive explaining ML and the prosecutions and 
liabilities that arise over association of the knowledge thereof.22 Considering the history on 
the rise of ML at an international level, Europe and the rest of the international financial 
community created measures to be able to develop a conceptual framework to understand, 
regulate, control and possibly eradicate ML in a continual evolutionary context. 
Undoubtedly the war on drugs ushered in the development of the AML industry. Peter 
Alldrige, a professor of law, agrees that the AML industry arose due to the failure of the 
international community to successfully resolve the war on drugs; the very existence of AML 
is contingent on the criminalisation of activities surrounding illicit activity and extends the 
scope to funds obtained through the activities.23 One asserts that the development of the 
                                                          
20 Angelique Chrisafis, 'Spotlight turns to slick IRA money-making machine' The Guardian (March 2005) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/feb/19/northernireland.northernireland1> accessed 22 August 2016 
21 George H Smith, 'John Locke: Money and private property' (Libertarianism.org, 20 November 2015) 
<http://www.libertarianism.org/columns/john-locke-money-private-property> accessed 22 August 2016 
22 International Bar Association, 'Europe' (IBA Anti-Money Laundering Forum) <http://www.anti-
moneylaundering.org/Europe.aspx> accessed 22 August 2016 
23 Peter Alldridge, What went wrong with money laundering law? (Palgrave macmillan 2016)  
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definition of such activities expands the scope of ML creating complex instances for 
application. 
Developments 
The global approach on AML assumes extreme importance, especially in regards to the 
advancement and interconnectedness of policies and rules that are ever changing.  The 
conglomerate of organisations that seek to promote AML have unfortunately established 
certain boundaries on the accessibility and influence on establishing universal regimes. The 
growing global concern of ML, and the access to transnational markets by criminal, has 
helped to fuel the establishment of bodies to infiltrate ML systems at macro level. Some of 
these bodies can be seen to frustrate the international community and can be seen to 
introduce new levels of regulations through soft law measures aiming for strict enforcement 
from an unimposing position.24 Considering AML from an international customary law point 
of view, arguments will look at established standards and how they convince the 
international community to further tackle ML together.  
Because of the pluralistic economic nature of Europe, the EU provides a conglomerate of 
directives to reflect both the diversity within the union and the need for unification of a 
governing standard of the rule of law. The key to AML here is the effectiveness and 
cooperation of member states on mandatory rules. The EU is very much supported by laws 
and is not subjected to restrictions that FATF or the IMF may impose, this is not to say their 
                                                          
24 Kern Alexander, The Legalisation Of The International Money Laundering Regime- The Role Of The Financial 
Action Task Force (1st edn, ESRC Center for Business Research, University of Cambridge 2000) 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp177.pdf> accessed 22 August 2016. 
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powers are limited over non-compliant states.25 In the event of a political challenge, these 
powers are supported further by judicial powers which can give these bodies the discretion 
to validate lawful sources of funds and motives. Over 30 years, AML regimes have shown 
the move from drug trafficking, expansion of the definition of predicate crimes and TF, now 
covering an international scope. Binding and enforceable directives are permitted to 
infiltrate the laws of finance regardless of jurisdictional governance. The EU, comprising of 
28 Member States conclude on standards for reporting, monitoring and compliance. The 
implementation of the 3 directives in the last 20+ years has furthered the commitment on 
combatting ML within Europe especially in concerns to contracting member states. The 
directives can be likened to FATF 49 recommendations and in comparison can set standards 
of a micro-prudential nature. The binding nature of EU directives forgo the ideals of the 
international community and member states that believe in state autonomy (giving rise to 
the most recent Brexit and the ongoing actions for exemption from the EU from Turkey)26  
The EU has relied on reporting and interchange of information. Its laws conceptualised 
countermeasures of ML in order to create a rationale on what may provide a basis for AML 
laws. Over time the international standard on ML has deconstructed the reasons behind 
why ML is such an issue. Since states are reviewing ML costs, it has been down to 
governments to prioritise fair market conduct within the markets economy. Agreeing with, 
Dr Hinterseer previous director of UniCredit bank, the idea that ML began under socio-
                                                          
25 FATF Secretariat, 'Financial action task force an introduction to the FATF and its work what is the FATF? 
What are the FATF recommendations? What are the benefits of implementing the FATF recommendations?' 
(2010) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/Introduction%20to%20the%20FATF.pdf> accessed 22 
August 2016 
26 Liz Cookman, 'Turkey, the Brexit bogeyman, is not so different from the UK' The Guardian (19 July 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/25/turkey-brexit-uk-leave-campaign-migrant-turks-
britain> accessed 22 August 2016 
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political challenge and has now evolved to become bigger, with political gains and advances 
now at the forefront of ML.27 It is without a doubt the28G8 supported the need for regimes 
to take part in national and international level AML regimes. Dr Amandine Scherrer, a policy 
analyst at the European Parliament, provided the reasoning behind the implementation of 
soft law29 – to further fuel hard law as a means of facilitating international cooperation. In 
agreement with Scherrer,30 John Kirton,31 director of G20 Research group, examines 
compliance to improve AML standards by specifically soft law regimes, allowing the 
international community to unify to combat ML under the G8(now G20) regime. The 
introduction of this intervention facilitates cooperative regulation to tailor state economic 
management, accumulating to complete global ‘structural forces’.32 
Ioannides lists key regulatory bodies and regulations: The United Nations Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, the OECD, the 
UNODC, 1988 Basel Capital Accord, 2000 Wolfsberg Global AML Guidelines for Private 
Banking, the ECB, the IMF, and the World Bank. With EU and the UN in mind, Ioannides 
observes that FATF can be known as a substantial foundation for developing transnational 
cooperation over organised crime and the proceeds that arise from it.33 The academic 
community have voiced their variances on what constitutes organised crime; the divergence 
                                                          
27 Kris Hinterseer, Criminal finance: The political economy of money laundering in a comparative legal 
context (Kluwer Law International 2002) 
28 '1989 economic declaration', (16 July 1989) 
<http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1989paris/communique/index.html> accessed 1 August 2016 
29 Amandine Scherrer, 'Explaining Compliance with International Commitments to Combat Financial Crime: The 
G8 and FATF' (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris 2006) <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/scherrer.pdf> 
accessed 29 July 2016 
30 Scherrer, note 19. 
31 John Kirton, 'Explaining compliance with G8 finance commitments: Agency, Institutionalization and 
structure' (2006) 17(4-5) Open Economies Review 459–475 
32 Kirton note 20 
33 Ioannides, note 14. 
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in geographical location does impact views on activity but this problem is readily solved by 
what such activities produce. Scherrer also supports the notion that the understanding of 
transnational crime will always be at the brunt of academics’ ability to extend their 
criticisms, but their acumen is sanctimonious in comparison to what established 
organisations have come to understand.34 
International bodies  
On discussing the definition of ML, the EU and its’ Council has figured out the importance of 
penalising organised crime active both in state and across borders.35 There are, although, 
difficulties in the penalisation of international ML – the sharing of information helps to 
monitor the compliance of formalities. As Ruman Fanugi purports macro and micro level 
financial management is currently being well supervised by FATF because it merges powers 
from the legislative domain and the financial sector to deal with the sophisticated and 
complex manner in which money launderers conduct their finances and secrete their 
identity in the process.36  There is larger scope for the advancement of AML and both Levi 
and Gilmore suggest that advancement may only arise from how well states conform to 
monitoring bodies.37 This assumes that the governance by FATF enforces both basic and 
advanced principles of law that must be recognised by all financial services looking to 
globally combat ML. Implementation of FATF inspired legalities can be reviewed in the 
                                                          
34 Scherrer, note 19. 
35 Article 39,30(1) & 34 (2)(b) of the treaty of the EU  
36 Commonwealth Secretariat, Combating money laundering and terrorist financing (2nd edn, Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2007 
37 Michael Levi and Bill Gilmore, 'Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual 
Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control?' (2002) 4(2) European Journal of Law Reform 337–364 
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development of the Egmont group which established a cumulative body of FIUs to stimulate 
universal cooperation on reporting.38 
IMF 
After 9/11 the IMF took the initiative to develop a standard over ML in regards to TF. It 
funds AML/CFT strategy to ensure that member states are engaging over substantial 
financial measures. It establishes an international standard and is funding limits the excuses 
member states may raise to the IMF. As a surveillance mechanism one can agree that it 
upholds international financial veracity. In line with ICL, it is the presumption that with help 
from Article IV consultations,39 the IMF uses AML and CFT initiatives to boost the integrity of 
the international markets.40  The 188 countries a party to ensuring that a legitimate financial 
market is preserved notices the policies and procedures, and creates an economic 
standard.41 Despite the fact that this body is limited in enforcement powers its drive is to 
ensure that there is a global consensus on the solicitation of international AML principles.42  
                                                          
38 'The Egmont group of financial intelligence units', (19 July 2016) <http://www.egmontgroup.org/> accessed 
4 August 2016 
39 International Monetary Fund, 'The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism' (21 March 2016) <http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-
Against-Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism> accessed 24 August 2016 
40 IMF, 'Factsheet -- the IMF and the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism' (21 March 
2016) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm> accessed 30 June 2016  
41 International Monetary Fund, 'Anti-money laundering/ combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) - The 
Fund’s involvement in AML/CFT' <https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm> accessed 24 
August 2016 
42 Jack Boorman and Stefan Ingves, 'International Monetary Fund, financial system abuse, financial crime and 
money Laundering— background paper' (monetary and exchange affairs and policy development and review 
departments in consultation with legal and other department 2001) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.pdf> accessed 27 July 2016 
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The IMF as a compliment to the international community has without doubt prompted a 
response to ML at global scale.43 Its assessments have shown how unity between key bodies 
within the global community can ensure that harmonisation conquers technological 
advances, and it initiatives, like the FSAP, may take on increased roles. With the support of 
the World Bank a global regime on AML was established and the global economy witnessed 
the creation of FATF in 1989. 44 Both the IMF and the World Bank, with immense 
synchronisation, are seen to affect the manner by which FATF operates at global scale. The 
evolution of AML regimes within the IMF have seen the development of the international 
surveillance on institutions that play a significant role within the global economy.45 Data 
shows that the IMF’s AML regimes are better examined in developing states and emerging 
markets.  Figure 2 shows that the IMF have an established global influence on monetary and 
exchange affairs, it’s focus centred mainly in Africa and Asia, purporting to the fact that 
influence requires expansion for a multiregional effect. The data below shows that as a body 
that works alone its scope is not wide enough. 
                                                          
43 International Monetary Fund, 'Public information notice no. 11/74' (27 June 2011) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1174.htm> accessed 4 August 2016 
44 Michael Levi and Peter Reuter, 'Money laundering' (The University of Chicago 2006) 
<http://faculty.publicpolicy.umd.edu/sites/default/files/reuter/files/levi_and_reuter.pdf> accessed 29 July 
2016 
45 Jeroen Cremer, 'AML regulations part. 2' (Compliance - Wise, June 2016) <https://www.compliance-
wise.com/where-does-transaction-monitoring-come-from/> accessed 24 August 2016 
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(Figure 2) Technical assistance by the IMF46 
FATF, the IMF, UN, OECD and bodies alike emphasise the transnational nature of money 
laundering. Alldrige suggests that the sparse variety in what ML is seen as creates some 
vagueness.47 One institute in particular seeks to clarify the disparities and its AML regimes 
seek to show the global community that a global problem requires transparency to be able 
to effectively shape the ways states cumulatively recognise international norms. 
FATF 
Ioannides purports that technological encroachments facilitate the evolution of ML. FATF 
“parallel forces” join as both a preventative and conciliatory measure to withstand the 
increasing development of the cybernetic economy. The intergovernmental body made 
up of 35 member jurisdictions, with an added 2 originating as regional organisations,48 
provides AML global standards. A fact sheet by the IMF concludes that for integrity to be 
recognised within the international financial community FATF recommendations must 
                                                          
46 IMF, 'Technical assistance FY2003' (2003) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/techass/techass.htm#box1> accessed 5 August 2016 
47 Alldrige, note 16 
48 fatf-gafi 2016, 'Members and observers - financial action task force (FATF)' (2016) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/> accessed 8 August 2016 
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establish a framework which manages the “mechanisms of international cooperation”49. 
– This further highlights the importance of FATF as a “multidisciplinary group”, as the 
only institute that uses it transnational powers to gain access and infiltrate the financial 
markets. Min Zhu, a Chinese economist, emphasises the economic need for global 
financial frameworks to be able to action ethical requirements over the movement of 
money.50 This mega body continuously reviews how states a party to its 
recommendations commonly apply and comply with measures to bring effect to 
AML/CFT. The 1990s introduced the FATF 40 recommendations,51 aiming for global 
application. Most recently this body has shown that through the revision of 
recommendation 5 on CDD, the banking industry can ensure that states understand that 
ML involves facilitating the financing of travel for an individual seeking to embark in 
terrorist activities.52 The over extension may create a complex affect and questions what 
amounts to the criminalisation of ML, namely the men’s rea (mental/knowledgeable) 
aspect of facilitating a crime. The Da Silva case explored in the UK described the men’s 
rea of ML as one that may have an “inkling or fleeting thought” of conduct, especially 
pertaining to those who may operate within the financial sector.53 FATF has developed to 
ensure that its recommendations are not considered lightly by outlining frameworks for 
AML action, whilst ensuring there is practicality in application which is shown in 
reflecting the expanding dimension of ML.  Implications are assessed where the financial, 
                                                          
49 IMF, note 29 
50 ibid, note 51 
51 FATF, 'The FATF recommendations' (2016) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 8 August 
2016 
52 17 October to 23 October 2015' (October 2015) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/fatf-plenary-october-2015.html> accessed 8 August 2016 
53 R v Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654 Lexis Web 
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legal and operational business economy attempts to constructively define ML. Mitsilegas 
examines that the expansion of AML regimes creates a restraint on legal certainty, the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) has extended its scope in a definitional manner, and 
by way of activity.54 
 
By assessing the revision of recommendations FATF has been the catalyst in the 
introduction of FATF-Style Regional Bodies alike GIABA and MENAFATF. This particular 
development has been the key to effective application of FATF recommendations in the 
developing markets, with provision of methodologies for the effectivity of its AML 
systems. FATF has essentially been built on the failure to combat the war on drugs by G7, 
accumulative with the first legislative act, making laundering a crime,55 and the Vienna 
convention working within the international domain. Presuming that the growth of 
transnational policing amounts with the increase of financial actors, FATF as a body that 
feeds off of the socio-political and economic developments, may only steer the 
international community in the manner that it is influenced in. 
 
Aldridge comments on the unrepresentative nature of FATF, which may cause problems 
in the validation of certain policies due to lack of transparency of policy makers.56 States 
may rightly question the validity of AML policies delivered to the international 
community, considering that the basis of FATF foundation lack treaty support. The critical 
evaluation of models and frameworks developed by FATF suggest the application of its 
                                                          
54 S 330(2) 
55 The money laundering control act 1988 
56 ibid, note 24 
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recommendations are difficult to implement because it is known as a soft-law 
mechanism, which purports its devised minimum standards. Until states recognise FATF 
recommendations in their laws, it is meaningless, and has no greater effect than to name 
and shame. The OECD observer reports that FATF considers the financial implications 
that follow the failure in implementing AML regimes, alike establishing sanction on 
transactions derived from states which do not uphold the reporting recommendations 
made customary by FATF.57  
 
(Figure 3) OECD state compliance with basic FATF recommendations58 
 
                                                          
57 OECD, '‘Name and shame’ can work for money laundering' OECD Observer No 223 (October 2000) 
<http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/358/_93Name_and_shame_94_can_work_for_mo
ney_laundering.html> accessed 9 August 2016; 
58 OECD development, 'OECD countries’ compliance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 
5, 6, 8 & 9.' (Pinterest 2014) <https://uk.pinterest.com/pin/68891069274569338/> accessed 9 August 2016 
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In highlighting the key developments of FATF standards, information shows that this body 
develops whilst understanding the implementation and evaluation of recommendations, 
with help from interpretive notes. Despite this, as of 2014 the body still failed to generate a 
constructive compliance mechanism within developing OECD markets, with 0% compliance 
on CDD and PEPs. This data supports the notion that developing states are likely to be less 
compliant because of they may not acquire as many resources as those within the western 
hemisphere. The discussion on the recommendations proposed requires unanimous 
implementation for global effectiveness, although it can be argued that the influence of 
transnational bodies is not as powerful as they assume to be. There is the assumption that 
transparency and accountability will only be recognised globally where it is both “pervasive 
and indefinite”.59 Basic recommendations fulfil their potential when integrated within 
multinational initiatives pursuant to political commitments on targeting ML. The 
international financial system is greatly influenced by the most common manner of trade of 
finance which is banking – this requires a continuous risk assessment with help of the World 
bank,60 FATF 49 recommendations, FATF methodology, UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime and UN International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism. These bodies accumulatively store information for effective assessment of cross-
border development.61 The SAFE intervenios case establishes pre-existing norms from the 
                                                          
59 Ibid, note 24 
60 OECD, 'Policy brief: financial action task force on money laundering' (FATF - OECD 1999) 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/PB9906_en.pdf> accessed 29 June 2016  
61 The World Bank, 'Money laundering/terrorist financing risk assessment' (29 February 2016) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialmarketintegrity/brief/antimoney-laundering-and-combating-
the-financing-of-terrorism-risk-assessment-support> accessed 29 June 2016 
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international financial regulatory community, which although is not initially legally binding,62  
revises EU policy commitments by way of the ECJ for member states to agree to maintain. In 
reviewing the case below the question on how FATF defines CDD/AML, what requirement 
financial institutions must maintain, especially in regards to KYC, is explored and observes 
the manner in which international law evolves to suggest a new structure on the 
management of the global market economy. 
Review: SAFE INTERVIOS case 
The ECJ case on ML has become a major factor in cross-border developments on AML.  It is 
the understanding that this case allows FATF to identify ICL from an international 
perspective relative to banking and financial institution regulation and practices in 
preventing ML. The review of activity on CDD as a facility for adequate risk management, by 
FSPs, at regional level establishes requirements for unification of global risk management.63 
The SAFE case assessed the inability for the FSP to be able to offer “additional”64 data on 
customer transactional information, and the FSPs failure to comply resulted in the closing of 
several accounts. As a result of these closures the FSP appealed against the decision, stating 
that the court had no authority in pursuing the AML regimes in this manner because firstly, 
it would have an unfair impact on the institute from a competition law point of view. 
Secondly, the requirement for disclosure of information was too wide a scope to be 
                                                          
62 unknown, 'Legal alert- New AML/CDD requirements following the ECJ’s CASE C-235/14 REGARDING SAFE 
INTERENVIOS' (Bonn & Schmitt advocats 2016) 
<http://bonnschmitt.net/fileadmin/media/Legal_Info_Our_Publications/Our_Legal_Alerts/B_S_Legal_Alert_N
ew_tendencies_of_KYC_after_the_ECJs_case_Safe_Interevios_SA.pdf> accessed 17 August 2016 
63 Dirk Helbing, 'Globally networked risks and how to respond' (2013) 497(7447) Nature <http://gu.friends-
partners.org/Global_University/Global%20University%20System/List%20Distributions/2013/MTI2396_201305
08/nature12047%20copy.pdf> accessed 16 August 2016 51–59 
64 Case C-235/14 Safe Interenvios, SA v Liberbank, SA Banco de Sabadell, SA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 
SA [2015] ECJ  
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covered. Relying on the Bank of Spain as its supervisor it felt it was only subjected to what 
the operative regulator required.65 Liberbank SA, Banco de Sabadell SA,  Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria SA were the three banks to terminate customer activities of those who 
they felt brought a greater risk for the working of the bank. Their ability to do this showed 
that the case recognised the need for the banking industry to be adequately interlinked to 
exercise its own powers, especially where sharing of information is required between 
partner banking. SAFE contested with the legalities of a partner bank being able to shut the 
client accounts due to the regulatory makeup of its AML and CDD requirements, and the 
powers the ECJ maintain in intervening in this respect. Not only did this case assert the ECJ’s 
position in ensuring AML is maintained at national and EU level, but the opinion of the 
advocate general purports that FATF serves its purpose in creating standards that establish 
international norms. 
These cases look at what constitutes ML and the ECJ’s decision gives a clearer insight into 
how it is defined in alignment with FATF. The court established that major AML norms 
come from FATF (49 recommendations)66 and the obligatory factor in remaining in line with 
them.67 The identified issue saw an extension of CDD obligations placed on banking and the 
affiliation and management they have with their customers and other FSP. Here the 
European commission’s application of the ECJ’s decision extended FATF regulatory powers 
in EU’s Member State AML regimes. These powers were expressed in the manner by which 
banks took steps, recognising AML and CDD in relation to other financial entities, 
                                                          
65 Law 10/2010 article 2 
66 See note. 39 
67 Recommendation 2- FATF 
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dependant on risk level. This measure, to reflect the level of risk that potentially may exist 
at the time, are observed where the banks acknowledge the risk, pursue judgement, and 
rightfully close the accounts that were of an implication to their personal AML regimes.68 
The ECJ’s realignment of interpretations changes the dynamics of EU AML regime by 
ensuring the AML directive69  is in line with the FATF definition of what CDD is, and further, 
how FATF defines what banks or FSP’s roles are in combatting ML.70 The recently 
recognised definition enlarges its scope of application71 – laws get stricter and tougher and 
as they do this they reveal elements of vagueness. Kevin Sullivan agrees that the disparities 
in regulatory opinions implicates compliance.72 At EU level too many strict laws are 
rendered ineffective until states have the ability to transpose regional based directives at a 
domestic law level. Not only does this make the directive more effective in application but 
the added local peculiarity can make it more specific to the financial institutions within the 
state. Further implications arise when adopted at local level because of differences in local 
legislation. As opposed to regulations that are imposed at secondary level, the use of 
directives incurs a range of variances for states that have subsidiaries elsewhere. One 
purports that regulatory instruments have a better effect, especially in line with uniformity 
of the global market economy, in creating an international framework. The FATF standards 
have, through the case, been given firm legal footing at European level introducing a level 
of austerity on regulatory practises and rules, especially for any that can incur implications 
                                                          
68 See note. 50  
69 DIRECTIVE 2005/60/EC 
70 Directive 2007/64/EC  
71 See note.50 
72 Kevin Sullivan, Anti-money laundering in a nutshell: Awareness and compliance for financial personnel and 
business managers (APress 2014) 50–53 ch 4 
 
Candidate number: 1545582 
Page | 23  
 
on regulatory practices.  An analysis of the idea of too strict application of this provision is 
rebuked where banking institution with lax AML regimes are considered counterproductive, 
against activity within a region heavily dominated by regulatory bodies against ML. This is 
asserted in recognition of the possibility in engaging in the support of TF. To expect to have 
no other requirement than what is imposed by the state operating in is farfetched, and 
questions security regimes. 
As mentioned, this case reviews the aims of FATF regarding what constitutes ML and 
terrorism. By reviewing the risks exposed by financial activities, their acknowledgement 
that regardless of the fact that the same risk may not appear in every given situation, it 
should not detract from the idea that financial institutions must take measure to protect 
the global economy. The actions to close the accounts proved that CDD has the ability to 
revoke customer engagement in markets by way of assessing customer risk in relation to 
their business activities. This refutes the ability for criminals to gain easy access to the 
internal markets as a result of banking practices failures.73 The decision by the ECJ has used 
EU law to convert the recommendation into hard law for compulsory application. Its 
transnational nature of information sharing could play a role in the development of 
operational relationships between one or more entity. By Liberbank SA, Banco de Sabadell 
SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA requesting for customer information, this case 
supports banking rights over operational data protection in regards to CDD regimes. 
                                                          
73 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 'DIRECTIVE 2005/60/EC - The 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing' 
(Official journal of the European union 2005) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0015:0036:en:PDF> accessed 16 August 2016 
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Review: Opinion of advocate general  
Advocate general Eleanor Sharpston acknowledged that the reviewing of customer 
accounts is not a strange phenomenon within the world of finance and banking.74 If 
anything, the lack there of increases the risk of engagement in ML and the effect it will 
have on other banks that use its services. Complying with CDD regimes is effective where 
the suspicion of ML exists and extends beyond reasonable doubt where the FSP may 
engage with clients whose financial matters are transnational in nature with large levels of 
movement. This discussion considered that the assessment of risk as an obligation, as key 
to understanding each case from its own perspective rather than a generic assumption. As 
market participants engage in different activities, assessments must be made pursuant to 
the nature of service provided. Bearing in mind that there is the likelihood risk 
management may fail, one can assess that Sharpston position on risk based mitigation in 
line with FATF, is based on the measures taken by the individual institutions and how well 
they follow guidance provided.75 
The disclosure of information is tasking, and the excuse that national data protection is 
restricted to laws on jurisdictional basis is incorrect, the idea that ‘no man is an island’ 
stands out here as no financial institute functions alone. Where risk exists information 
transference must be fluid in order to address gaps that may arise as a result of lack of 
understanding of a customer and his or her relationship with the financial institution. 
Sharpston looks at the legitimate interest the banks had in asking for more information and 
                                                          
74 Note 49, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston  
75 FATF, 'GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH THE BANKING SECTOR' (2014) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-Based-Approach-Banking-Sector.pdf> accessed 17 August 2016 
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that this action was justifiable in this respect. Getting the international community to 
understand this norm is beneficial, as it means that access to information can aid in 
understanding transnational organised crime as a whole. Restrictions on access to 
information breaks down communication and goes against the UN mandate for the 
international combatting of ML.76 
Sharpston addressed the widening of the CDD scope and refutes the notion that 
cooperation amongst competent authorities implicates competition within the European 
markets.77 Her opinions holds great weight in the development of the ECJ’s ruling, released 
prior to the ECJ’s decision, it can be seen as an anchor of reasoning on which way the court 
should decide. By analysing her response to the case, an answer is produced clarifying how 
to establish CDD norms for international cooperation between institutions.78 A 
conglomerate of regulators aid in quality assurance of oversight to prevent the 
depreciation of a corporation’s value and any likelihood of reputational damage. 79 
Concerning all that has been discussed above there are some questions that may arise 
pertaining to implications on ensuring EU Member States law are more effective and stricter 
and do not contend with FATF recommendations. Article 52(1) of the charter of 
fundamental rights of the EU discusses the legitimate basis for limiting privacy rights. In this 
instance, according to proportionality, assessments must adhere to FATF recommendations 
to decipher when to apply this fundamental right. James Sheptycki observes that what may 
constitute a financial institution for instance, may alter within time to narrow or broaden its 
                                                          
76 FATF special recommendations V 
77 See Note. 59 
78 Recommendation 27 FATF 
79 See Note .57 
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scope and can affect its experiential nature.80 Sheptychi recognises the two manners to 
establish definitions by a denotative and connotative manner and in a transnational 
application can form to mean two different things. Transnational organised crime defined by 
the World Ministerial Conference use words like: group organisations; links; laundering of 
illicit proceeds; the transference between different borders and affiliations with other 
groups. This definition recognises “…that organized transnational crime is a major concern 
of all countries and … calls for a concerted response from the international community..”81 
This definition can effect regulatory practices and rules, as even within the UK grasping the 
concept of transnational can create some difficulties on allocation and performance of 
regulatory powers.82 Addressed in the SAFE case, evidence suggests that SAFE did not 
understand the powers enabled to the banks to close the accounts. The ECJ’s binding 
doctrine on banking conduct in regards to AML shows that EU law uses its discretion to 
better align its fragmented practise and this case proves that FATF outlines the best 
interpretations for effective AML regimes. 
CDD- widened scope 
From the international law perspective, the ECJ’s binding decision over the FATF 
recommendation on how companies, financial firms and banks ought to behave, widens the 
scope on how agencies interact with national authorities. Reflecting this point is the UK 
regarding POCA, nationally, and regionally, prior to the recent exit from Europe. This case 
                                                          
80 James Sheptycki, 'Teaching and learning guide for: Transnational crime and transnational policing' (2009) 
3(6) Sociology Compass 1029–1033 
81 IMOLIN, 'CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE' (United Nations General Assembly Forty-ninth session 
Agenda item 96 1994) <https://www.imolin.org/imolin/naples.html> accessed 15 August 2016 
82 IMOLIN, 'REPORT OF THE WORLD MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME' 
(United nations general assembly 1994) <https://www.imolin.org/imolin/naples.html> accessed 17 August 
2016 
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has made a distinct statement on how the public and private sector should react to ML 
nationally and internationally. The opinions of the advocate general were key to ensuring 
risk management was understood, and information sharing was adhered to adequately for 
ML detection. FATF was used to update observed standards on information sharing between 
the private sector and began to establish itself heavily in the European community (with 
help of the Egmont group). The SAFE case found ways to enhance the implementation of 
international standards.83 The parallel between FATF standards and evolving risks assessed 
its application in the global network and suggests that through this case it is becoming the 
international template for combatting ML and factors pertaining to it. This is not to say that 
FATF is omnipotent and reserves all powers, it still requires assistance to deal with TF, 84but 
in the event of DD it is the belief that it adequately breaks down this element of risk 
management.85 
Over time the UK’s legislation had been governed to effect by AML directives, refining of 
these laws means CDD requirements change and require clarification on application. The 
next chapter looks at CDD from both an UK and international perspective on what it means 
for legalities to conform to one understanding, and the likelihood of eradicating local 
disparities at definition basis. By paying attention to details and asking: What constitutes 
ML? What is a financial institution? What are the operational requirements? An assessment 
of how the international community can expand the coverage of global regulations. The 
                                                          
83 See note, 52 
84 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
85 fatf-gafi 2016, 'The financial action task force leads renewed global effort to counter terrorist financing' 
(2016) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/fatf-leads-renewed-global-effort-to-
counter-terrorist-financing.html> accessed 15 August 2016 
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legal and regulatory advances from the SAFE case have clarified the understanding of AML 
on a European/ regional level. Now the question remains on how to further the scope and 
how to solve the disparate problem. 
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Chapter 3 -UK application of EU law  
Introduction to the findings 
The background of AML practises in the UK are established from the POCA 2002 and UK 
money laundering legislation 2007 which are inherently based on EU legislations which have 
developed its standards from FATF.86 These standards pertain to activities of regulated 
bodies and the criminalisation of ML activities. A report by the UK Home Affairs Committee 
explained that “without doubt…the UK is a destination for laundered money.” 87  As a state 
with one of the highest concentrations of foreign bank branches in the world, it is a 
container for headquarters of multinational companies. London specifically is recognised 
globally as the largest financial centre.88 The divergence in its economy can be related to a 
free market as the UK’s vulnerabilities in the financial market stem from the relationships it 
has with other states who are either highly regulated or not. What this shows is the 
increased need for CDD in transactional based activities and that the UK, despite the large 
network of AML regimes, is struggling to protect their financial markets.89 HMRC in 2015 
had taken steps as an enforcement body to ensure that there is strict compliance of AML 
Procedures on all level of payment activities,90 but the assessment remains that EU 
                                                          
86 UK Government, ‘The Money Laundering Regulations 2007’ 
87 Estate Agent Today, 'Money laundering back on the agenda in government.' (ETSOS, July 2016) 
<https://www.estateagenttoday.co.uk/sponsored-content/2016/7/money-laundering-back-on-the-agenda-in-
government> accessed 17 August 2016 
88 Tim Wallace, 'Rule Britannia: London Overtakes New York As The World's Best Financial Centre' Telegraph 
(2015) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11884783/Rule-Britannia-
London-overtakes-New-York-as-the-worlds-best-financial-centre.html> accessed 26 August 2016. 
89 See note,6  
90 ETOS, 'HMRC spot checks, make sure your processes are compliant' (16 July 2015) <http://etsos.co.uk/hmrc-
spot-checks-make-sure-your-processes-are-compliant/> accessed 17 August 2016; HM Treasury, 'Anti-money 
laundering and counter terrorist finance supervision report 2013-14' (GOV.UK 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-finance-
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regulations may be complicating how the UK should establish their practices against ML and 
the confusion becomes a stepping stone for illicit undertakings. 
EU LAW 
Much blame has been placed on regulations established at EU level as to why it is difficult 
for the London markets to remain steadfast in the global AML network. From the view of 
the EU, which is devised of a single market, suggestions demonstrate that national 
economies pursue the mandates of the single market to assert fair competition rights and 
withstand the macroeconomic effects of ML. Relative to the EU initiative, policies or laws 
implemented pursue the idea of an international financial system and is pursuant to state 
application.  EU law on ML began in the 1980s, from there the 1991 money laundering 
directive placed the European community as a security actor that had cross-border powers. 
These powers although contested to by member states is presumed to be a prolific measure 
towards maintaining the single market for a purpose of integration. Developing from the 
Maastricht Treaty the later establishment of the EU aimed to promote soundness in the 
global economy. The introduction of FIUs are observed as recent developments and at EU 
application have been given too much a responsibility in too short a timescale. Mitsilegas 
comports the argument further on the rights provided to the different units and the benefits 
examined from having various levels of regulations in order to cover the European 
domain.91 EU law on AML developed to establish a strong rapport in as an observation of 
the international community as key initiator of security governance beyond the national 
                                                          
supervision-reports/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-terrorist-finance-supervision-report-2013-
14#fnref:7> accessed 17 August 2016 
91 Valsamis Mitsilegas, Money laundering counter-measures in the European Union: A new paradigm of security 
governance versus fundamental legal principles (Kluwer Law International 2003) 
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domain. There were challenges on EU AML measures viewed through the constant 
expansion and broadening of categories of ML – legal certainty was required in order to 
establish grounded principles for the continued development of EU measures.92 The 
suggestion that the difficulty they have to assert a restrictive approach to AML is reliant on 
the continuous updating of legislation is incorrect; as established earlier in the paper 
technological advances develop the ways ML is conducted in the global economy so it would 
only make sense for measures to adopt the continuous developmental technique.  
Banking practises emerged in policy development from the Basel committee beginning in 
1988, identifying those affiliated with banking institutions and regimes devised as an 
accolade to already establish international initiatives. Basel statement of principles are only 
enhanced by FATF for global harmonisation and in the same way POCA and the UK ML 
regulations establish FATF in their national domain presenting national authorities 
mandated to fight against ML with compliance regimes.93 
UK AML framework  
The UK’s AML framework shows the UK Treasury to be in charge of delegating supervisors 
over AML/CFT and distributes monitory powers between them. There is wide scope on the 
sectors of supervision from estate agents to casinos, with 27 supervisory bodies to 
facilitate. The range from global to smaller professional bodies to public sector 
organisations is an example of how the scope of regulation is covered. The treasury works 
with these bodies to establish a recognised system of transparency on good market 
                                                          
92 See note, 75 
93 Recommendation 13-16 
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supervision and its practices. A 1996 report on the incorporation of the NCIS exemplified 
the development of UK’s AML system and facilitated in establishing a better information 
gathering system.94 The NCIS’s ability to analyse and exchange information even with the 
technological advancement of ML, as an example to the international community, shows 
FIU’s as a more adequate resources to support FATF. 
As of 2014 there were changes made to the supervisory structure of the FCA which became 
the sole manager of consumer credit for financial institutions, and HMRC as the supervisor 
for estate agents. A year later the UK regulatory regime was revamped by CILEx.95 This 
development came after the previous existing financial services authority was replaced 
because of the difficulty it faced in maintaining its duties over suspicious transactions 
reports.96 The latter development of the FCA enables its duties on AML to be resumed 
especially in light of the division of banking and business conduct.  
UK due diligence in light of SAFE  
In light of the case discussed in the previous chapter, one reviews the effects the ECJ’s 
decision has on the UK. The decision on CDD may affect regulatory practises or rules in the 
UK as the ECJ holds power to create a basis for UK laws to follow in terms of what may be 
implemented. It is acknowledged that the UK must comply with EU AML laws on CDD and 
KYC, and legal obligations on AML norms, but in advancing its AML measure CDD should first 
be examined. The UK’s government policy position on CDD outlines the various levels of DD 
                                                          
94 'FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING TABLE OF CONTENTS', (FATF 1997) 7–9 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1996%201997%20ENG.pdf> accessed 17 August 
2016 
95 See note, 77 HM Treasury 
96 See note, 77 ETOS 
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and establishes an understanding on risk management.97 With reference to FATF UK banking 
and businesses are subjected to the standards outlined relative to EDD. For UK business 
conduct, it outlines the superior nature of FATF and the criminalisation of failing to disclose 
a suspicion of ML, even in respects to understanding business relationship.98 
UK Developments  
Recent developments have been established from the understanding that ML is a global 
issue and the UK as a prominent international financial centre will be exposed to external 
risks. Developing the governmental powers over AML is key in pursuing those who expose 
the markets. The UK can develop its AML measures by working through international 
groups and relative cohorts to extend it regulatory scope to foreign actors that participate 
in its markets. It is conceited that in order to defend the UK’s financial system cross-border 
cooperation,99 via CDD measures acknowledged at an international level by international 
organisations that interact, should be progressively examined. 100 
The UK has observed a new review on CDD and KYC requirement inspired by FATF with the 
development of the 4th AML directive.  UK implementations, by 2017, may enforce 
substantial CDD regimes extending the responsibilities of banking and financial institutional 
requirements. With the consensus of the EU community the UK can establish a generic 
                                                          
97 HM Revenue & Customs, 'Money laundering regulations: Your responsibilities' (5 August 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/money-laundering-regulations-your-responsibilities> accessed 17 August 2016 
98 POCA 2002 
99 Cabinet Office, 'Anti-Corruption Summit 2016' (GOV.UK 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-
events/anti-corruption-summit-london-2016/about> accessed 18 August 2016 
100 Home Office and HM Treasury, 'Action Plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance' (2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517992/6-2118-
Action_Plan_for_Anti-Money_Laundering__web_.pdf> accessed 17 August 2016 
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standard on digital identity which is becoming a dominant feature in transactional based 
relationships.101 Thoughts suggest a devised international obligatory framework on 
reporting and maintenance structures examines unity. 
3rd Money Laundering directive  
By aiming to ensure that FATF’s customary standards are recognised on a global domain the 
definitions within its directives have outlined CDD requirements. It was implemented by the 
UK in the year 2007, assessing DD from a third party perspective, expanding bodies that 
were agreed as financial institutions to credit institutions, auditors, tax advisors and high 
value goods dealers. Relative to the SAFE case, the credit institution performing the service 
for the others should have been constrained to measures surrounding DD.102 
3 major bodies within the European established the 4TH EU AML directive, for a common 
European standard implementing FATF recommendations and observes to annul already 
existing MLR 2007 by replacing it. For the UK this would have been acknowledged as an 
advancement in ensuring uniformity on how to ensure that it can interact with its European 
counterparts. Member States must acknowledge that domestic legislation is co-dependent 
on EU directives, and considering that the UK has reserved their powers to revoke their 
membership with the EU, must seek to ensure the domestic laws compliment the updated 
European requirements. One may reject the argument that the new ML directive is difficult 
                                                          
101 Pinsent Masons LLP, 'UK government aims to make it easier for companies to meet anti-money laundering 
duties' Out-Law (1 September 2015) <http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/september/uk-government-
aims-to-make-it-easier-for-companies-to-meet-anti-money-laundering-duties/> accessed 17 August 2016 
102 HM Government, 'Implementing the Third money laundering directive: A consultation document' (2006) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/moneylaundering310706.pdf> accessed 17 August 2016 
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for UK to implement, considering that its foundations stem from FATF. Pertaining to 
mitigating risk of ML, the UK has already proved that it can cover this particular scope. By 
implementing a National Risk Assessment, they have reflected the work of FATF to engage 
with other supervisors and used collated information on risk to support and enhance UK 
domestic supervisory legislation on AML.103  
What does this mean for the United Kingdom?  
The development of directives and revised recommendations,104 considering the transfer of 
securities by offshore companies into the UK, assesses the requirement of additional 
measures used to combat the socio-political ties existing with the EU. An example is the 
Channel Islands as an offshore centre,105 recommendation 30 purports the introduction of 
AML standards and the EU action plan to combat crime, through a common policy states 
can establish AML against organised crime.106 This new directive is major in the European 
domain,107  in repealing Directive 2005/60/EC the AML policies devised by the UK will have 
to recalibrate its already existing structure on AML. Possible implications may be that it 
would cost too much for the UK to conduct and the global community may observe the UK 
                                                          
103 HM Treasury and Home Office, 'UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing' 
(15 October 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-risk-assessment-of-money-
laundering-and-terrorist-financing> accessed 17 August 2016 
104 Recommendation 25 
105 Vanessa Houlder, 'Jersey confident as offshore financial centre despite credit downgrade' Financial 
Times (March 2016) <https://www.ft.com/content/284d23e8-e6dd-11e5-bc31-138df2ae9ee6> accessed 20 
August 2016 
106 Valsamis Mitsilegas, Money laundering counter-measures in the European Union: A new paradigm of 
security governance versus fundamental legal principles (Kluwer Law International 2003) 
107 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, 'DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849' (Official journal of the 
European Union 2015) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2015:141:FULL&from=EN> accessed 17 August 2016 
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refuting this new directive in wake of Brexit maintaining its pre-existing rules as it may feel 
as though POCA108 does enough. 
The 3rd MLD created a standard on basic DD processes and within the UK impacted the 
control of banking and investment firms. The 4th is presumed to try to enhance the 
standard of procedural conduct enhancing compliance with the FCA, POCA and other 
bodies of enforcement. 109 POCA has been amended countless times by the use of statutory 
instruments.110 Implemented in 2003, it criminalises failures to disclose suspicious 
transactions, placing and obligation of adopting CDD measures in order to find suspicion; 
necessitates all financial institution in the UK to have AML/CFT training. This is not to say 
POCA’s measures are not active in the combating of drug trade,111 but the large 
movements of cash in the UK is a reason why there are expanded investigatory powers 
over duties of individuals and businesses.112 
CDD & KYC alignment with FATF  
The SAFE case did not create new resolutions of obligation; the element it precluded to was 
the ability to ensure that obligations are imposed from the recommendations outlined in 
FATF. Through the MLD,113 the EU attempts to establish maintenance of the international 
                                                          
108 UK Government, 'Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) Money Laundering Provisions' (Home Office 2015). 
109 ETAY KATZ and Allen & Overy LLP, 'Implementation of the Third Money Laundering Directive – an overview' 
(Law and Financial Markets review 2007) accessed 17 August 2016 
110 Serious crime act 2015; HM Government, 'Serious crime act 2015 fact sheet: Amendments to the proceeds 
of crime act 2002 background' (2002) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415945/Fact_sheet_-
_Amendments_to_the_Proceeds_of_Crime_Act_2002.pdf#> accessed 18 August 2016 
111 See note, 17 page 21 
112 Bankers Academy, 'Regulatory compliance' (2015) <http://bankersacademy.com/resources/free-
tutorials/57-ba-free-tutorials> accessed 18 August 2016 
113 Directive (EU) 2015/849  
 
Candidate number: 1545582 
Page | 37  
 
standard for those using any type of financial service, on identity verification, and the 
institutes the responsibility to ensure suspicion of ML is easily reviewed from both an 
insider and outsider perspective. State operational obligations on individual banking CDD 
measures, over business relationships, account for the cross-border gap.  A possible 
complication of application in diminishing state responsibilities, can create 
incompatibilities, increasing expenses to ensure that every bank-business relationship 
extends their AML/ CDD regime beyond national territory. 
The UK’s application in light of the SAFE case observes some implications of AML practises. 
By understanding that AML norms are derived from FATF it gives the ECJ and advocate 
general a substantive regulatory right over how the UK must examine the directives as a 
mechanism that reflects recommendations on background checks on the customer and 
beneficial owner.114 To an extent this diminishes the UK’s government operative powers on 
how to establish customer risk at national level. 
Challenges faced at international level 
CDD is observed as a measure to access all levels of risk, and this reasoning justifies why it 
is important for the other banks to get information from the customers, this right must not 
be  questioned by sustained personal data and privacy laws.115  The FATF recommendations 
establishes an ICL standard through the SAFE case , prior to the decisions of the case , 
acknowledging AML regimes was already mandatory, time and technology has brought to 
effect the progression of the role market participants play in relation to ML and must go 
                                                          
114 Article 8(1)(b); see note, 49 paragraph 21. 
115 See note,52 
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beyond national AML requirements, especially pursuant to the coverage institutions may 
have as the financial markets transcends into the global domain. The benefits of this is a 
generic understanding that banks can do more by legitimately requesting for more. 
Although this will be an issue for the international community on how much information 
sharing is too much? The suggestion that FATF recommendations are the template for 
directives on AML116 may mean that participants in the financial markets must create their 
operational standards based on the advice an intergovernmental body. The UK application 
of this requirement has transposed the MLD’s with ease because the EU as its previous 
enactor provided FATF recommendations as the EU binding authority.117 
KYC & CDD 
To further understand CDD from an international standpoint, KYC must be examined for 
continuous intelligence on the pattern of customer transactions. There will however, always 
be a degree of distance between institutions and customers, but it is up to the regulators to 
ensure there is not a great gap. By assessing the 3 elements to KYC on customer 
identification, DD and EDD, institutions ensure a follow up from the first day the 
customer/client examines an interest in the institution to subsequent everyday activities. 
This standard establishes international norms by which a number of institutions have 
devised measures to work with their governments to assume minimum responsibilities.118 
Broad identification duty,119 can implicate the establishment of a global consensus on 
                                                          
116 See note, 89 
117 See note 26 
118 Recommendation 10-11 
119 Article 3, Article 11 (f) DIRECTIVE (EU) 2015/849; recommendation 13 
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recognising generic instances of ML establishing a burden on institutes that attempt to work 
together. 
Basic CDD120 is an assessment activity of an entities information and enhanced purporting 
to thorough handling of information. In the event market participants may try to evade tax 
or are in operations with shell companies, which has restrictions on ownership disclosure. 
FATF recognises what substantiates adequate CDD and creates minimum requirement 
responsibilities for financial institutions to ensure states a party to its recommendations 
apply scrutiny to their disclosure measures.121  The UK’s transparency on financial activities 
makes it easier for the EU to assess how active its national authorities are in asserting 
recognised standards on basic CDD.122 Its reflection of FATF recommendation 20-23 
recognises the benefit from a business conduct point of view and further extends to 
banking supervision, especially in regards to lending.123 For the UK, aligning prudential 
controls with  financial institution activities creates a level of austerity against the 
exploitation of market integrity. It is of the opinion that the UK’s relationship with the EU 
allows for its provision to have an effect on its non-EU related bilateral relationships 
reinforcing international CDD standards to those who are not directly a party to the EU.  
Enhanced CDD applies to situations where identity has been concealed whilst controlling 
legal entities, this recognises an ongoing process for higher level risk based supervision. The 
UK application of this measure may consult the transmission of information to other 
                                                          
120 Cf note 105,  
121 See note, 60 
122 HM Government, ‘The money laundering regulations 2007’ 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2157/pdfs/uksi_20072157_en.pdf>accessed 20 August 2016 
123 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Customer due diligence for banks' (Bank for international 
settlements 2001) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016 
 
Candidate number: 1545582 
Page | 40  
 
member states within the EU, 124 pertaining to fraud activities, PEPs and banking.  One 
supposes that the 3rd party DD is a broader identifying and reporting mechanism over asset 
cloaking against corruption supported by The Bribery act 2010.125  
Benefits of the UK – EU relationship 
One may presume that the exchange of information between developing states reflected 
by The Council regulation126 examines the 3rd MLD on disrupting ML on a global level.127 
Cross-border correspondent banking extends 3rd party DD beyond regulatory scope of EU 
payment services. 128 A criticism on vague terms examines UK’s attempt to implement rules 
and to define terminology which can be misconstrued on a global level.129 Although UK law 
has to follow the EU law on ML, even with the recent Brexit, the UK can still benefit from 
developing EU AML policies. The consideration and main focus looks beyond the powers of 
the EU on the UK legislative body but more so on the leeway given over refining definitions, 
elevating the scope of AML obligations of the UK towards the international community.  
There are benefits examined in banking supervision, examined by the FCA/PRA division 
dabbling in any activity pertaining to the creation of banks and the latter activities. For 
safety and soundness of the UK economy a lot of the UK banking industry is made up of 
foreign institutions and presumably the UK’s financial regulation must take up the form 
                                                          
124 Article 4-5 of council regulation (EC) 1889/2005 
125 Vincent Béglé, 'Conducting Third party due diligence' (ETHIC Intelligence, 22 March 2012) 
<http://www.ethic-intelligence.com/experts/157-conducting-third-party-due-diligence/> accessed 20 August 
2016 
126 See, note 105 
127 Recommendation VII FATF 
128 Directive 2005/60/EC 
129 cf. 109, article 17 (2) 
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that will cater for the international banking community. With this in mind the disclosure 
environment works for the benefit of UK to get a greater understanding of the institutions 
that have taken residence within it regulatory domain. Reflective on the development of 
the Basel committee on banking practices, realisations that KYC regimes alone are 
insufficient, and that standards on CDD align with FATF examine safety and soundness of 
banking practises. 130 This supports the idea that a conglomerate of banks within the UK 
produces a risk that extends beyond the UK markets and its possible deficiencies should be 
managed.  
The UK actively promotes DD and because it looks to regulate higher level risk and 
establishes a malleable solution to compliance of activities that have a greater risk basis.131 
Application of the 3rd MLD examines its effectiveness in supporting CDD measures as it 
safeguards the legitimate transactions from illegitimate ones. By reviewing all those a party 
there is a greater understanding on how corruption is affiliated with ML especially from the 
international standpoint and how relative to FATF this may be recognised through 
established global standard. 
HM’s treasury examines UKs previous decision to restrict extension to classify letting agents 
as financial/credit institutions, restricting function abilities with international partners on 
the tackling of vulnerabilities within the property sector. 132 This will have an adverse effect 
on the global combatting of ML because of the recognition that ML is being conducted in 
more innovative manner. FATF recognises, through its recommendations, that the financial 
                                                          
130 SEE note 1 
131 The Bribery Act 2010 
132 See note 91 
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systems scope of regulation should be enhanced beyond just banking financial institutions 
so long as they require customer identification and maintain an element of DD.133  Financial 
activity has developed from what it was classified as in the 2nd MLD. Recent advancements 
show the UK is extending their regulatory scope to letting agents on property transactions 
used as an avenue for ML. Today both the Money laundering regulation 2007 and POCA  is 
recognised as a standard setting body within the UK on conducting CDD.134 
Despite today’s standard setting bodies, the UK must reconsider costs, compliance, and 
enforcement activity, for the new 4th MLD if they decide to remain a party to it. They also 
have to revise their definition of a PEP, 135 to compose a better understanding on corruption 
and fraud. Establishing duties on institutions to recognise risk sensitivity for CDD,136 are just 
a few ways to evolve ML barriers and establish effective reporting mechanisms. An account 
by the law society expressed the development of ML offences in the face of criminal law.137 
Today, definition based reliance on the courts are scarce with persuasion arising from the 
international community.138  
 The UK-EU relationship benefits from transnational policing methods and networks of 
regulation as information gathering is proving more and more diverse and new institutions 
are created with sparse diversity of monetary and policing powers. In assessing the concerns 
on data protection and human rights on looks to the disparities in EU member states within 
                                                          
133 Recommendations 12-120 FATF 
134 Fi Walkley, 'How do money laundering regulations affect me?'Foxtons (19 April 2016) 
<http://www.foxtons.co.uk/discover/2016/04/how-do-money-laundering-regulations-affect-me.html> 
accessed 17 August 2016 
135 (ARTICLE 398) DIRECTIVE 2005/60/EC), 
136 article 7, ibid 
137 Money Laundering Guidance ([Law Society] 2004). 
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the FIUs, there is a burden placed on the understanding of how wide the EU system should 
operate although the council’s decision has narrowed the problem to ensure all the 
different FIU’s cooperate with each other for fluid information exchange. With over 50 
different FIU’S,139 although the accumulation of intelligence on an EU basis will be a 
substantial international development, one may suggest that there will always exist 
variances in laws. With many bodies unification will incur difficulties, but will be adequate to 
establish a centralised database. 
Corruption is akin to illicit financial movement from the western hemisphere through to 
developing states, often the global financial system identifies financial actors as a cause for 
implemented harsh regimes to restrict facilitation of ML. 140 Though ICL could be adopted 
and promoted, there is a recognised difficulty in establishing harmonisation in national 
rules on corruption especially pursuant to rights on privacy. It is my perception that central 
banks may be able to resolve this issue on DD of financial transactions especially over those 
who have substantial powers over state activities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
139 'The Egmont group', (2016) <http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/list-of-members/by-region/europe> 
accessed 17 August 2016 
140 Fatima-Zahra Boukhari, 'Illicit financial flows from developing countries' (infomineo, 15 January 2016) 
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Chapter 4- Ghana  
Key features of the comparative 
ICL is observed to be steered by the UN and two bodies examine the transnational nature 
of ML. The UNTOC on international cooperation, transparency and accountability, 
connecting with FATF, UNTOC examines the transnational aspect of crime and fraud and 
the global community, upon acknowledgment of Ioannides discussion on the UNTOC’s web 
of countermeasures.141 UNCAC compliments UNTOC in using the law for already establish 
civil and criminal laws as mechanisms for confiscation and punishment. UNCAC’s definition 
of corruption expands the scope beyond the receipt of bribery and abuse of powers for 
personal gain, supporting FATF in linking it with ML.142 The discussion on PEPs in Ghana and 
the UK suggest that the control on corruption as an AML measure are both correlated 
towards wealth distribution and state control. Understanding political and financial risks 
within the international domain may engage in transnational resolution especially where 
activities are dominant. 
The Enron scandal is an example of threatening financial security as a matter of corruption, 
in the face of ML which had an adverse effect on the global economy.143  In 2011 a report 
by Michael Ogisi estimated that within the sub-Saharan African business domain 76% of its 
                                                          
141 Ioannides note,15 
142 'Money Laundering' (Oecd.org) <https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/moneylaundering.htm> 
accessed 22 August 2016. 
143 Joe Kay, 'The Enron Verdicts: Corruption And American Capitalism - World Socialist Web Site' (Wsws.org, 
2006) <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/05/enro-m29.html> accessed 22 August 2016. 
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median $1,481.06 GDP is acknowledged as a derivative of corruption and is widespread.144 
Its implications on social and economic development145 interlinks it with ML and the 
relationship it can examine with weak business practices. 
PEPs & corruption  
Corruption has been recognised as an internal enemy threatening the integrity of AML and 
is a recognised as a product of ML.146 Credit and financial institutions with subsidiaries 
elsewhere especially in developing states can be the reason why regulations are partially 
deficient. It is usually in this instance that we find PEPs take advantage of business 
relationships and corruption levels within, states, reliant on the access to economic 
regulations. PEP’s are prominent public actors and the associates of those engaging in the 
public sector.147 Establishing a transnational financial regulatory trail as an international 
standard must be made effective in state legislation on ownership. Access to PEP financial 
conduct is crucial as we find that especially in the African context this class of persons to be 
a major root cause of corruption. John Hatchard and Jeremy Pope examine corruption from 
the standpoint of political will and laws and regulations, concluding that they work hand in 
hand in order to effectively combat ML, one does not suffice alone.148 
                                                          
144 Gallup, 'Is Corruption Widespread within business located in this country, or not?' (Gallup.com 2011) 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/154571/majority-worldwide-sees-widespread-corruption-businesses.aspx> 
accessed 20 August 2016 
145 The World Bank and Dina Elnaggar, 'Q&A: Innovations in the fight against corruption' (World Bank Live, May 
2012) <http://live.worldbank.org/qa-innovations-fight-against-corruption> accessed 20 August 2016 
146 Ioannides, note 15, page 72 
147 Mariano FERNÁNDEZ SALAS, The Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive And The Legal Profession (1st edn, 
2005) <http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=7B528765-CB1F-4748-
9733-68935E2C4745> accessed 22 August 2016. 
148 John Hatchard, Combating Corruption (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014). 
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AML and international relations 
There are different grades of what may constitute a crime reliant on the various 
jurisdictions, ideals vary and this is not beneficial. Extraterritorial legal impact on 
developing states incur threats and actions that may not be beneficial to the global 
economy, for instance, black listing will increase the risk of a state and not ensure the EDD 
is conducted properly on PEPs. The most dominant international AML regimes has been 
influenced substantially by global financial crisis and has implemented most of its bodies 
accordingly.149 The international struggle to remain on top of developments within the 
markets can be recognised as a catalyst for corruption, and ML can easily be transferred 
through states. A major issue is that AML regimes do not work as quick and as a result is 
very slow in keeping up with market trading between Pep’s and those who act on their 
behalf.150 The Jacobellis v Ohio case saw the US supreme court explain corruption as 
something that, on an international level, may be hard to explain, but certain acts 
determine, within its definitional scope the link between abuses of power and personal 
gain. 
 
(Figure 7) 
 
                                                          
149 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'The Basel committee’s response to the financial crisis: 
Report to the G20' (Bank for international settlement 2010) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf> accessed 
21 August 2016 
150 See note 31 
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The graph above shows Illicit financial flows of a 9 year period from developing states.151 
This reflects pertinent literature of ICC’s concerns over effect of ML – so far the discussion 
has been on AML and trade finance, and has annulled the argument that strict rules 
implicates the movement of finance at an international level.152 Corporate governance as a 
means to refute corruption within the state of Ghana establishes banking practices; Energy 
bank for example acts to maintain strict  AML programs all in the name of best practice. 
This regards the relationship between banking management and ML, but does stricter rules 
mean better AML?153 The developing economies, mainly African states, are known to lack 
ethical practices and discipline in leadership,154 and the restraints on establishing 
democracy becomes a motive for corruption. Reviews on off-shore companies are 
exemplary to the western hemisphere’s version of AML regime abuses by way of 
manipulating global tax requirements.155 Weak international standards have fuelled the 
association of tax evasion and PEPs, and UK is the example of how its various constitutional 
relations can establish offshore centres and services that escape the regulatory regime on 
global standards of best practises.156 
                                                          
151 Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers, 'Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2004-2013' (2015) 
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final.pdf> accessed 15 
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152 Sam Fleming, 'ICC flags up concerns over effect of money-laundering laws’ Financial Times (19 
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153 Energy Bank Ghana, 'Corporate governance' 
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154 Kwame Frimpong and Gloria Jacques, Corruption, Democracy, And Good Governance In Africa 
(Lightbooks 2001). 
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Findings: Ghanaian activity  
As of 2012 Ghana was removed from the high risk state list developed by FATF this creates 
a domicile for AML within the Ghanaian financial markets, 157 thus generating a system of 
AML laws which will bring to effect a global consensus on ML resolutions. Prior to the 
removal Ghana had failed to assert the political will against criminalising corruption and 
ML.158 
 
(Figure 4) Ghana and UKs corruption indexes 159 
                                                          
157 Lawrence Quartey, 'Ghana delisted from high risk money laundering/terrorist financing nations' (The 
African Report 2012) <http://www.theafricareport.com/West-Africa/ghana-delisted-from-high-risk-money-
launderingterrorist-financing-nations.html> accessed 22 August 2016 
158 Ibid. note 135 page 295 para 10.2.4 
159 Freedom House 2013, 'Highest and Lowest Perception of Government Corruption in Free Press Countries' 
(2013) <http://www.economistaterry.com/2013/11/the-concomitance-of-religiosity.html> accessed 20 August 
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By way of FATF the GIABA has intervened in domestic ML,160  by extending the scope to 
contain the element of personal use which counters the international mandate against 
organised crime. Even from the recent declassification of risk state status, Ghana has lost 
market confidence with a high percentage of likelihood that PEPs are a considerably 
substantial cause of ML and corruption. This is supported by the rise in Ghana’s corruption 
index.161 
 
(Figure 5) Ghana corruption index 
                                                          
160 'Ghana Loses Over $2.8 Million Dollars Through Money Laundering - GIABA' (Ghana Trade - Official SME 
Product Portal and Web Gallery) <http://ghanatrade.gov.gh/Latest-News/ghana-loses-over-28-million-dollars-
through-money-laundering-giaba.html> accessed 22 August 2016. 
161 Trading Economics, 'Ghana corruption index 1998-2016' (2016) 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/corruption-index> accessed 20 August 2016 
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(Figure 6) Ghana government spending  
 Correlations can be assessed between Ghana’s corruption index and government 
spending, 162 which reached an all-time high between 2014 -2016. This reflects why there is 
a lack of public confidence in their political parties with a 4.1 out of 5 rating belief that 
political parties engage in corruption.163 The recent scandal within the Ghanaian judicial 
system recognised systemic problems of corruption relative to investigatory privacy 
rights.164  Ghana’s secrecy levels play a role in transparency and global access to 
information – data research165 reflects further why the public domain requires reforms 
parallel to AML regimes as in order reflect FATF. 
                                                          
162 Trading economics, 'Ghana Government spending' (2016) 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/government-spending> accessed 20 August 2016 
163 Transparency International, 'Transparency international - country profiles' (2016) 
<http://www.transparency.org/country#GHA_PublicOpinion> accessed 20 August 2016 
164 Transparency International, 'Ghana Authorities Need To Investigate Thoroughly Allegations Of Judicial 
Corruption' (2015) 
<http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/ghana_authorities_need_to_investigate_thoroughly_allega
tions_of_judicial_co> accessed 20 August 2016. 
165 'Transparency International - Ghana' (Transparency.org, 2016) 
<http://www.transparency.org/country#GHA_DataResearch> accessed 20 August 2016. 
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A questionnaire distributed to FSP’s reflect that a range of bodies for the prevention of ML 
govern the monetary services. Eco Bank subsidiaries in the UK have proved to maintain the 
states CDD measures to align with the rules the state of Ghana had implemented to ensure 
transnational cooperation (appendices Results 1&2). For further reinforcement Eco Bank 
within Ghana enforces a Company Conformity Assessment Program manual to establish 
best business practises on trade, requiring those using their service to action state laws. 
(appendices Results 3)   
Ghana relative to FATF 
GIABA has been introduced by FAFT to regenerate the AML culture of West Africa. Ghana in 
relation to this body has been subjected to reforms from deficiencies that they experienced 
in 2009 – not acting in compliance with recommendations on CDD and PEPs.166 The 
development of the state’s public commitment via legislative and institutional framework 
developments created an environment for financial activities to remain in line with FATF 
pursing global aim in combatting of ML. Despite a series of acts governing the Ghanaian 
economy,167 substantial developments eliminating its high risk level were observed through 
the AML regulations 2011 and Economic and Organised Crime Office Act 2011. This created 
an assurance that the state has the ability to conform its financial institutions, by way of 
government, to establish a strong AML network. Following from the struggle, to initially 
align its AML measures with FATF, it is ones’ assertion that it was an ineffective 
                                                          
166 GIABA, 'Mutual evaluation report, anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism - 
GHANA' (INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ACTION GROUP AGAINST MONEY LAUNDERING IN WEST AFRICA 2009) 
<http://www.giaba.org/media/f/341_Ghana%20Executive%20Summary%20-%20Eng-1> accessed 22 August 
2016 
167 Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), 2008 
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enforcement tool and GIABA through the mutual evaluation report is a better actionable 
measure for a developing state like Ghana. GIABA together with FATF establishes a network 
that pushes governance in West Africa to ensure their laws are effective against the 
facilitation of ML whatever form it may take. 
The 1960 Criminal Offences Act supports the idea that ML can be as a result of a range of 
predicate offences. Complementary to the above act, the Banking Act 749 criminalises acts 
that refute CDD regimes. Difficulties that arise from disclosure activities, regulation of PEPs 
and understanding of conflict of interest are found to be examined in developing states like 
Ghana. The Global corruption barometer estimated 27% engaged in bribes in the public 
services domain.168 Regulation of such will only be accomplished by “transparent handling(s) 
of …investigations and subsequent sanctions...”.169 The discussion has recognised the 
transnational element of ML and thus requires the international community to be diligent in 
managing its jurisdictional powers for protection. 
ML within developing states like Ghana can witness the proceeds of corruption move from 
one state to another. A great benefit from international customary practises is the ability 
for a developing state to action their laws by support of FIU’s. Merging law enforcements 
and the private sector active investigations on PEP’s is only effective as and when states 
                                                          
168 Michael Ofori Amanfo Boateng, 'Corruption barometer: 54% says corruption has increased in Ghana' (2012) 
<http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201307/109126.php> accessed 23 August 2016 
169 Stephen Odoi Larbi, 'Anas’ evidence against judges must be probed without interference – TI | 
Kasapa102.5FM' KaspaFM Online (22 September 2015) <https://kasapafmonline.com/2015/09/22/anas-
evidence-against-judges-must-be-probed-without-interference-ti/> accessed 20 August 2016 
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interact with them. What this means is that international cooperation may be stunted by 
the failures of developing states to ensure their FIU’s are active.170  
Any negative externalities? 
Ghana and the rest of West Africa are observed to have a culture that readily accepts 
corruption as a political norm.171 Attempts to reform the ideals of political bodies can be a 
challenge, despite being named a nucleus of West Africa’s narcotics trade. In a report by 
UNODC,172 Ghana’s many AML laws struggled to acknowledge the importance of aligning its 
regimes with the international community establishing a system to scrutinise government 
proposal of AML laws. And because the definitional base for PEPs are broad it will have to 
look the international community for clarity. The IOSCO has also recognised that consensus 
should be established on a global level and further recommends that cooperation between 
national authorities may be the best focus for gaining international assistance on ML 
issues.173  To do this states must be a party to FATF or the FSRB or otherwise be named and 
shamed.174 The ability to extend conviction rights to activities that cause proceeds of crime 
                                                          
170 ESAAMLG, 'Mutual evaluation report anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
republic of Angola' (ESAAMLG 2012) 
<http://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/ANGOLA_MUTUAL_EVALUATION_DETAIL_REPORT.pdf> accessed 23 
August 2016 
171 Jonty Bloom, 'Radio 4 - today- political corruption' (BBC) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/reports/archive/politics/political_corruption.shtml> accessed 23 August 
2016 
172 UNODC, 'COCAINE TRAFFICKING IN WESTERN AFRICA SITUATION REPORT' (2007) 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf> accessed 29 August 
2016 
173 IOSCO, 'Report on money laundering' (2008) <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD26.pdf> 
accessed 30 June 2016 
174 Ibid note,135 page 284 
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to cross boarders, may introduce conflicts based on differences of jurisdictional ability to 
establish  successful AML regime.  
The analysis of Ghana and UK’s cross-border development on ML and CDD, In the interest 
of Justice and where two states are in conflict on prosecution rights, FATF should be an 
establisher of measures pertaining to punishment.175 As an actor between the UK and 
Ghana a bilateral treaty to establish CDD measures on funds control, on a risk sensitive 
basis, is noticed as a measure for cross-border development .176 Financial products 
generally have restrictions and regulations to ensure that they are not abused. Harmonising 
rules is a barrier mechanism and unifying the UK and Ghanaian ideals on corruption may 
solve some competing issues that may arise and establishes a dependency on the UK as a 
state that actively pursues AML. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
175 Recommendation 37 
176 EMERGING MARKETS COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
'Report on cross-border activities of market intermediaries in emerging markets' (2005) 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD193.pdf> accessed 30 June 2016 
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Chapter 5- Conclusions & Recommendations 
White collar crime is an example of corruption recognised in the UK and western 
hemisphere and compared to Ghana has established legislative measure that are 
considerably durable whilst refusing to accept corrupt behaviours as part of their economic 
culture.  The issue of flexibility, fluency and responsiveness of regulations are key 
components to effective management of businesses that cross borders.177  A report by the 
FCA examines the importance of having an authority that commits to ensuring institutional 
compliance by way of laws.178 
Brexit & AML 
Brexit as a political commitment to refute the dominance of the EU in its political course 
may mean that the UK would now have to either renegotiate or maintain its EU-UK AML 
commitments on powers of treaties.179 To date there are no substantial developments on 
AML regimes to reflect the independence of the UK; the fact that the UK’s ML regulation 
2007 reflects the 3rd MLD may incur difficulties on the restructuring of UK laws and go 
against EU and international cooperation.180 Considerations are given in regards to the  
2017 4th MLD implementation, and where the UK will stand in regards to its developments. 
Whether the leave will have an effect on financial crime is reliant on the UK’s approach 
                                                          
177 Kenneth S Blazejewski, 'The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and 
Accountability of Trans governmental Networks' (Temple University 2009) 
<http://www.temple.edu/law/ticlj/ticlj22-1Blazejewski.pdf> accessed 23 August 2016 
178 DIRECTIVE 2005/60/EC 
179 Article 50 Treaty of Lisbon 
180 'Brexit and AML', (ihatemoneylaundering, 25 June 2016) 
<https://ihatemoneylaundering.wordpress.com/2016/06/25/brexit-and-aml/> accessed 23 August 2016 
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towards maintaining FATF requirements and sanctions imposed on some business activities 
which could vary from the EU.181 To improve global AML practises, one believes that it is in 
the UK’s best interest to maintain the EU resolutions on AML especially within the banking 
sector. Although regulatory impact on the UK is predominantly unknown at this moment in 
time and will depend on negotiations formed, possible changes may be examined in the 
classification of risk profiles relative to the management of PEPs.182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
181 Sam Hemmant, 'Will Brexit affect UK’s approach to tackling financial crime? Anti-money laundering (AML), 
anti-bribery and corruption (ABC) and sanctions' (Lexis Nexis, June 2016) 
<http://bis.lexisnexis.co.uk/blog/posts/anti-money-laundering/will-brexit-affect-uks-approach-to-tackling-
financial-crime> accessed 23 August 2016 
182 Joe Dunphy, 'Regulatory impact of Brexit' (Finextra, 5 July 2016) 
<https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/12811/regulatory-impact-of-brexit> accessed 23 August 2016 
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Conclusions 
This paper aimed to assess the activity of ICL on AML developments. It considered the 
global bodies affecting financial practises over high risk states and any international 
resolutions that may extend powers to those that need it. 
The extension of definitions of what constitutes ML beyond the idea of narcotic handling 183 
has helped to change the way banking industries especially within the UK lead the fight 
towards establishing a more unified regime against AML.184 Banking practises observing 
core principles for a greater supervisory system, scrutinises transactions of a transnational 
nature. Infiltrating institutional frameworks of other states, establises CDD reliance 
recognised by FATF.185 Accepting ‘international institutions and conventions emerg(ing) to 
play a coordinative role’ supported in the SAFE case, reflects the manner by which the UK 
uses the 3rd MLD. This showed the balance of evasive investigatory measures,186  and the 
scrutiny Ghana faced in failing to regulate their PEPs.  
By grasping that there is no individual victim of AML, the international community can work 
together to establish a network to adequately protect the global economy. One substantial 
finding is that it is not what is ML but what amounts from the activity. A unification in 
regulatory training within the EU became the solution to establishing a common standard 
towards AML and resolved basic definitional issues. The beauty of the global economy is the 
                                                          
183 Recommendation 5 FATF 
184 Martin Bentham, '‘Britain’s FBI’ to lead fight on London’s dirty money' Evening Standard (8 April 2016) 
<http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/britain-s-fbi-to-lead-fight-on-london-s-dirty-money-a3221041.html> 
accessed 24 August 2016 
185 SEE note 1 
186 Ethan A. Nadelmann, 'Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society' (1990) 
44(04) International Organization 479–520 
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variances in financial institutions and how they all work together for the transference of 
money and commodities. Recognition of FAFT by the EU simplifies this problem of 
uniformity and extends the responsibility of legal reach as the UK shows through 
implementation of the 3rd MLD and is looking to incorporate the 4th. Something very 
important has been established in the world of risk management and that is the ability to 
apply DD in all manners of business relations regardless of the status of the individual within 
the state. Increasing controls over the activities of PEPs means bodies like the HMRC, 
assuming greater responsibility, create a larger network to cover the ever increasing scope 
of institutes that may be subjected to ML vulnerabilities.187 
FATF’s 3 primary functions on promoting, adoption and implementing of its AML standards 
face prohibitions, the adequate tools to combat ML exist but the main issue is on 
enforcement and implementation.188 FATF standards need more focus and precision for 
specific application at an international level to cover variances, which almost cannot be 
avoided because each state has its different legal regulations. Strict regulations can be 
disadvantageous to weaker institutions and so there must be a balance to establish 
uniformity. Failures of third parties, to do background checks on their customers, created an 
arena for civil resolutions. An understanding on the mental capacity of the crime has been 
seen to establish a system for punishment. Looser laws aid in applying classified civil 
activities to criminal punishment. 
                                                          
187 Arla regulation team, 'Anti-money laundering and letting agents' ARLA (June 2014) 
<http://www.arla.co.uk/news/june-2014/anti-money-laundering-and-letting-agents.aspx> accessed 17 August 
2016 
188 David Lewis, 'Ending Impunity: Creating a level playing field by enforcing the conventions we have' (2016) 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/tackling-corruption-together.html> accessed 
18 August 2016 
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The discussion on data protection laws as a defence mechanism is seen to be superseded by 
AML objectives. Discussions on internationalism and supporting governmental 
collaborations, to unify legal principles, examines governmental DD on combatting 
corruption and exchanging of information, works as the all-seeing eye over the global 
community. An understanding that the eye over the western hemisphere is much clearer, so 
to steer developing states through its readily regulative governing bodies, deals with corrupt 
officials who think they can escape the laws of their own lands. Global prohibition regimes 
exemplified in banking, establishes a consensus to make reasonable efforts to determine 
the true identity of all customers requesting the institution’s service. This shows states are 
now aligning their internal frameworks with ML countermeasures in order to sustain 
associations with other states that are working to be integrated in the financial markets, 
states like those in the EU.189 Chartering global trust in the private sector is proactively 
repressing strict laws. Ensuring that their expert based nature expands for states that may 
not have reached that domain with their own legal rules, making transparency a common 
feature for anti-corruption, anti-tax evasion, for a better developed network on financial 
stability.190  
 
 
                                                          
189 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper-Preparation of the Association Countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe for integration into the Internal marker of the Union (5 COM (1995) 163 final 
<http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_6_raporlar/1_1_white_papers/com1995_white_pap
er_preparation_for_eastern_european_countries.pdf> accessed  
190 Ibid Ioannides page 89 
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Recommendations 
A conglomerate of recommendations for international customary development examine 
opinions on (I)improved international alignment with FATF, (ii) increase use of 
harmonised banking practises cross-culturally, (iii) the bridging between subsidiaries in 
high risk states, (iv)use of the western hemisphere to assert the AML in the international 
community, (v) using diversity to better enforce FATF requirements, (vi) giving 
international bodies a more distinguished power.  
Diversity is a key factor in the disruption of AML regimes by which launders use to 
maximise their activities and remain under the radar. The discussion has requested a need 
for supervisory bodies to share information with each other.191 ICL practise for legal 
enforcers and financial institutions must maximise on their transparency network to work 
together. Blurring the lines may create more work, but will ensure a system of unbroken 
communication. Sullivan mentioned that when an AML investigation Is being conducted in 
line with legal enforcement the aperture on global engagement may steadily diminish.192  
To facilitate transparency there must be a reduction of cross-border complexities, a global 
consensus on risk focused measures simply recognise presumed risk. Exemplified in the 
consensus, technological advances create the gaps within the regulatory environment and 
this is where ML thrives,193 a solution is for regulatory laws to evolve with technology as a 
preventative measure rather than taking on a reactional nature. An international body 
                                                          
191The UK money laundering legislation 2012 
192 Ibid, note 60 
193 Ioannides note, 15 
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should review new found financial processes and how AML may be restricted through it, 
especially considering that electronic transactions are at the rise of this century. To add, 
creating initiatives like the Stockholm programme to expand the exchange of 
information,194 will aid in assessing high risk state profiles and link regulatory bodies that 
are effective and substantial in the regulatory domain. This will draw a map of all states and 
bodies that are inactive. FATF already has a list of states failing to assert AML regimes, 
access to state regulatory department can resolve these issues examined in the earlier 
discussed technological advancements. 
At national level AML regimes must develop an international nature and the standards set 
must establish trust within the international community, this is key in the evolving of 
standards that has shaped the cooperative, investigatory domain of AML. In order to do 
this, strict application of conflicting definitions should be clarified by FATF to simplify and 
improve institutional practices. The ECJ’s binding decision over the EU transfigured where 
to go to align regional standards. On state accountability regarding various global bodies, 
for example the UK-EU reliance to make effective the 4th MLD. It expands the scope of ML 
to other criminal offences 195 and widens the scope of the reporting mechanism. If national 
authorities ensure their experts share their experiences on corruption and ML, especially 
amongst the private sector, a domain to exchange views on compliance and control 
practises can assess the congruous nature of pre-existing AML regimes. 
                                                          
194 Council regulation (EC) 881/2002 
195 Amendments directive 91/309/EEC 
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Extending ML to cover predicate offences, as a wide spread concept, can use taxation laws 
to counter criminal activities. One asserts that this can help to enhance and clarify 
principles for the international community further regulating professionals active in the 
financial domain.196 James Freis supports the need to reveal hidden networks established 
by those who work with financial product, supporting wider regulation on departmental 
activities. 
Soft law introduces too many variances, a resolution is to introduce a global coalition to 
strengthen individual rules of law.197 Like the EU, the UK should use FATF to create an 
international consensus, establishing multilateral and unilateral action over deficient 
jurisdictions compromising the UKs financial regulatory system, to gain control.198 For 
impact to be paramount, as a prominent state, the UK’s development of multilateral 
operations forwards the agenda for internationalism.199 Recommended changes to the 
global financial industry reflects higher standard setting as to how the international 
community deals with ML and criminal assets. This in turn allows states to be fully immersed 
in influencing global networks on AML. 
 
 
                                                          
196 JAMES H. FREIS, '‘GLOBAL MARKETS AND GLOBAL VULNERABILITIES: FIGHTING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 
THROUGH FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE’ delivered at the academic session on ‘global initiatives to avoid the 
Mis(use) of the financial system for illegal purposes’ of the committee on Int' (FinCen 2008) 
<https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/pdf/20080425.pdf> accessed 18 August 2016 
197 Ibid, Ioannides page33 
198 HM Government, 'Advisory notice on money laundering and terrorist financing controls in overseas 
jurisdictions' (2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/534959/hmt_advisory_noti
ce_june_2016.pdf> accessed 24 August 2016 
199 Ibid note, 5 paragraph 11.32 
 
Candidate number: 1545582 
Page | 63  
 
Appendix A 
 
(Result 1) 
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Appendix B 
 
(Result B) 
 
 
 
 
 
Candidate number: 1545582 
Page | 65  
 
Appendix C 
 
 
 
(Result C) 
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